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ABSTRACT
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding attacks are
one of the biggest challenges to the availability of online ser-
vices today. These DDoS attacks overwhelm the victim with
huge volume of traffic and render it incapable of perform-
ing normal communication or crashes it completely. If there
are delays in detecting the flooding attacks, nothing much
can be done except to manually disconnect the victim and
fix the problem. With the rapid increase of DDoS volume
and frequency, the current DDoS detection technologies are
challenged to deal with huge attack volume in reasonable
and affordable response time.
In this paper, we propose HADEC, a Hadoop based Live
DDoS Detection framework to tackle efficient analysis of
flooding attacks by harnessing MapReduce and HDFS. We
implemented a counter-based DDoS detection algorithm for
four major flooding attacks (TCP-SYN, HTTP GET, UDP
and ICMP) in MapReduce, consisting of map and reduce
functions. We deployed a testbed to evaluate the perfor-
mance of HADEC framework for live DDoS detection. Based
on the experiment we showed that HADEC is capable of pro-
cessing and detecting DDoS attacks in affordable time.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) flooding at-
tacks are one of the biggest concerns for security and
network professionals. The first DDoS attack incident
[15] was reported in 1999 by the Computer Incident Ad-
visory Capability (CIAC). Since then, most of the DoS
attacks are distributed in nature and they continue to
grow in frequency, sophistication and bandwidth. The
main aim of these attacks is to overload the victim’s
machine and make his services unavailable, leading to
revenue losses.
Over the years DDoS has hit major companies and
Internet infrastructures, incurring significant loss in rev-
enues. Yahoo! experienced one of the first major DDoS
flooding attacks that made their services offline for about
2 hours [12]. In October 2002, 9 of the 13 DNS root
servers were shut down for an hour because of a DDoS
flooding attack [8]. During the fourth quarter of 2010, a
hacktivist group called Anonymous orchestrated major
DDoS flooding attacks and brought down the Master-
card, PostFinance, and Visa websites [7]. Most recently,
online banking sites of 9 major U.S. banks (i.e., Bank of
America, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bancorp, PNC,
Capital One, Fifth Third Bank, BB&T, and HSBC)
have been continuously the targets of powerful DDoS
flooding attack series [15]. The legacy of DDoS con-
tinue to grow in sophistication and volume with recent
attacks breaking the barrier of 100 Gbps [32]
The explosive increase in the volume of internet traffic
and sophistication of DDoS attacks have posed serious
challenges on how to analyze the DDoS attacks in a
scalable and accurate manner. For example, two of the
most popular open-source intrusion detection systems
(IDS), Snort [27] and Bro [25], maintain per-flow state
to detect anomalies. The Internet traffic doubles every
year and due to that monitoring large amount of traffic
in real-time anomaly detection with conventional IDS
has become a bottleneck.
In [20], Lee et al. has proposed a DDoS detection
method based on Hadoop [1]. They have used a Hadoop
based packet processor [19] and devised a MapReduce
[5] based detection algorithm against the HTTP GET
flooding attack. They employ a counter-based DDoS
detection algorithm in MapReduce that counts the to-
tal traffic volume or the number of web page requests
for picking out attackers from the clients. For experi-
ments, they used multiple Hadoop nodes (max. 10) in
parallel to show the performance gains for DDoS detec-
tion. Unfortunately, their proposed framework, in its
current form can only be used for offline batch process-
ing of huge volume of traces. The problem to develop a
real time defense system for live analysis still needs to
be tackled.
In this paper, we propose HADEC, a Hadoop based
Live DDoS Detection framework. HADEC is a novel
destination based DDoS defense mechanism that lever-
ages Hadoop to detect live DDoS flooding attacks in
wired networked systems. HADEC comprise of two
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main components, a capturing server and a detection
server. Live DDoS starts with the capturing of live net-
work traffic handled by the capturing server. The cap-
turing server then process the captured traffic to gen-
erate log file and transfer them to the detection server
for further processing. The detection server manages
a Hadoop cluster and on the receipt of the log file(s),
it starts a MapReduce based DDoS detection jobs on
the cluster nodes. The proposed framework implements
counter-based algorithm to detect four major DDoS
flooding attacks (TCP-SYN, UDP, ICMP and HTTP
GET). These algorithms executes as a reducer job on
the Hadoop detection cluster.
We also deploy a testbed for HADEC which con-
sists of a capturing server, detection server and a clus-
ter of ten physical machines, each connected via a Gi-
gabit LAN. We evaluate HADEC framework for live
DDoS detection by varying the attack volume and clus-
ter nodes. HADEC is capable of analyzing 20 GB of
log file, generated from 300 GBs of attack traffic, in ap-
prox. 8.35 mins on a cluster of 10 nodes. For small log
files representing 1.8 Gbps the overall detection time is
approx. 21 seconds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 de-
scribes the state of the art. §3 describes the HADEC
framework design. In §4 we discuss the testbed and
demonstrate the performance of the proposed frame-
work. Finally we conclude the paper in §5.
2. RELATED WORK
Since the inception of DDoS flooding attacks, sev-
eral defense mechanisms have been proposed to date in
the literature [32]. This section highlights the defense
mechanisms against two main DDoS flooding attacks,
followed by a discussion on the application of Mapre-
duce/Hadoop to combat network anomalies, Botnet and
DDoS related attacks.
The DDoS flooding attacks can be categorized into
two types based on the protocol level that is targeted:
network/transport-level attacks (UDP flood, ICMP flood,
DNS flood, TCP SYN flood, etc.) and application-
level attacks (HTTP GET/POST request). The defense
mechanisms against network/transport-level DDoS flood-
ing attacks roughly falls into four categories: source-
based, destination-based, network-based, and hybrid (dis-
tributed) and the defense mechanisms against application-
level DDoS flooding attacks have two main categories:
destination-based, and hybrid (distributed). Since the
application traffic is not accessible at the layer 2 and
layer 3, there is no network-based defense mechanism
for the application-level DDoS. Following is the sum-
mary of features and limitations for the DDoS defense
categories.
• Source-Based: In source-based defense mecha-
nism the detection and response are deployed at
the source hosts in an attempt to mitigate the
attack before it wastes lots of resources [21, 22].
Accuracy is a major concern in this approach as
it is difficult to differentiate legitimate and DDoS
attack traffic at the sources with low volume of
the traffic. Further there is low motivation for de-
ployment at the source ISP due to added cost for
community service.
• Destination-Based: In this case the detection
and response mechanisms are deployed at the des-
tination hosts. Access to the aggregate traffic near
the destination hosts makes the detection of DDoS
attack easier and cheaper, with high accuracy, than
other mechanisms [26, 28, 29]. On the downside
destination based mechanisms cannot preempt a
response to the attack before it reaches the victim
and wastes resources on the paths to the victim.
• Network-Based: With network-based approach
the detection and response are deployed at the in-
termediate networks (i.e., routers). The rational
behind this approach is to filter the attack traf-
fic at the intermediate networks and as close to
source as possible [23, 24]. Network-based DDoS
defenses incur high storage and processing over-
head at the routers and accurate attack detection
is also difficult due to lack of sufficient aggregated
traffic destined for the victims.
• Hybrid (Distributed): In hybrid approach there
is coordination among different network compo-
nents along the attack path and detection and
response mechanisms are deployed at various lo-
cations. Destination hosts and intermediate net-
works usually deploy detection mechanisms and
response usually occurs at the sources and the
upstream routers near the sources [30, 31]. Hy-
brid approach is more robust against DDoS at-
tacks, but due to distributed nature, it requires
more resources at various levels (e.g., destination,
source, and network) to tackle DDoS attacks. The
complexity and overhead because of the coordina-
tion and communication among distributed com-
ponents is also a limiting factor is smooth deploy-
ment of hybrid-based DDoS defenses.
Analysis of logs and network flows for anomaly detec-
tion has been a problem in the information security for
decades. New big data technologies, such as Hadoop,
has attracted the interest of the security community for
its promised ability to analyze and correlate security-
related heterogeneous data efficiently and at unprece-
dented scale and speeds [13]. In the rest of the section,
we review some recent techniques (other than [20] , dis-
cussed in §1) where Hadoop based frameworks are used
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to build affordable infrastructures for security applica-
tions.
BotCloud [17] propose a scalable P2P detection mech-
anism based on MapReduce and combination of host
and network approaches [18]. First they generate large
dataset of Netflow data [14] on an individual operator.
Next they applied a PageRank algorithm on the Net-
flow traces to differentiate the dependency of hosts con-
nected in P2P fashion for the detection of botnets. They
moved the pagerank algorithm to MapReduce and the
pagerank algorithm executes on data nodes of Hadoop
cluster for efficient execution.
Temporal and spatial traffic structures are essential
for anomaly detectors to accurately drive the statistics
from network traffic. Hadoop divides the data into mul-
tiple same size blocks, and distributes them in a clus-
ter of data nodes to be processed independently. This
could introduce a difficulty in analysis of network traf-
fic where related packets may be spread across different
block, thus dislocating traffic structures. Hashdoop [16]
resolve this potential weakness by using hash function
to divide traffic into blocks that preserve the spatial
and temporal traffic structures. In this way, Hashdoop
conserves all the advantages of the MapReduce model
for accurate and efficient anomaly detection of network
traffic.
Figure 1: Different Phases of HADEC
3. HADOOP DDOS DETECTION FRAME-
WORK
The Hadoop Based Live DDoS Detection Framework
(HADEC) comprise of four major phases (see fig. 1).
1. Network traffic capturing and Log generation.
2. Log transfer.
3. DDoS detection.
4. Result notification.
Each of the above mentioned phases are implemented
as separate components that communicate with each
other to perform their assigned task. Traffic capturing
and log generation are handled at the capturing server,
whereas DDoS detection and result notification is per-
formed by the detection server. Log transfer is han-
dled through web services. In the following subsections
we have explained the functionalities for each of the
phase/component in detail.
3.1 Traffic Capturing and Log Generation
live DDoS detection starts with the capturing of net-
work traffic. HADEC provides a web interface through
which the admin can tune the capturing server with de-
sired parameters. These parameters are; file size, num-
ber of files to be captured before initializing the detec-
tion phase and the path to save the captured file. Once
the admin is done with the configurations, the Traffic
Handler sends the property file to the Echo Class (a
java utility to generate logs) and start the capturing of
live network traffic (see fig. 2).
HADEC use the Tshark library [11] to capture live
network traffic. Tshark is an open source library capa-
ble of capturing huge amount of traffic. Under default
settings, Tshark library runs through command line,
and outputs the result on console. To log the traffic for
later use, we developed a java based utility (Echo Class)
to create a pipeline with Tshark and read all the out-
put packets from Tshark. We have also tuned Tshark
to output only the relevant information required during
detection phase. This includes information of times-
tamps, src IP, dst IP, packet protocol and brief packet
header information. Following are the snippets for TCP
(SYN), HTTP, UDP and ICMP packets that are logged
in the file.
TCP (SYN)
17956 45.406170 10.12.32.1 -> 10.12.32.101
TCP 119 [TCP Retransmission] 0 > 480 [SYN]
Seq=0 Win=10000 Len=43 MSS=1452 SACK_PERM=1
TSval=422940867 TSecr=0 WS=32
HTTP
46737 2641.808087 10.12.32.1 -> 10.12.32.101
HTTP 653 GET /posts/17076163/ivc/dddc?
_=1432840178190 HTTP/1.1
UDP
139875 138.04015 10.12.32.1 -> 10.12.32.101
UDP 50 Src port: 55348 Dst port: http
ICMP
229883 2658.8827 10.12.32.1 -> 10.12.32.1O1
ICMP 42 Echo (ping) request id=0x0001,
seq=11157/38187, ttl=63 (reply in 229884)
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As discussed above, the Traffic Handler sends the
property file to the Echo Class with the desired set of
parameters (file size, file count for detection and storage
path on the capturing server) set by the admin. Echo
Class use these parameters to generate a log file, at the
specified location, when it reads the required amount of
data from Tshark. Once the log file is generated, the
Echo Class also notifies the Traffic Handler (see fig. 2).
Figure 2: Network Traffic Capturing and Log
Generation Component
3.2 Log Transfer Phase
After the log file is generated, the Traffic Handler
in the capturing server will temporarily pause the traf-
fic capturing operations of Tshark. The traffic han-
dler will then notify the detection server and also share
the file information (file name, file path, server name,
etc.) with it via a webservice. The detection server
will initiate a Secure Copy or SCP protocol [10](with
pre-configured credentials) with the capturing server,
and transfer the log file from the capturing server (us-
ing the already shared name/path information) into its
local file system (see fig. 3).
Since the detection server mainly works as a Na-
meNode i.e. the centerpiece of the Hadoop cluster and
HDFS (Hadoop distributed file system), it has to trans-
fer the log file(s) from local storage to HDFS. On suc-
cessful transfer of log file into HDFS, the detection server
sends a positive acknowledgement to the capturing server
and both the servers delete that specific file from their
local storage to maintain healthy storage capacity. On
the receipt of successful log file transfer, the traffic han-
dler will restart the Tshark for capturing network traf-
fic. Before starting the DDoS detection process, the
detection server will wait for the final acknowledgment
from the capturing server. This acknowledgement vali-
dates that the desired number of files of a particular size
(set via parameters by admin) has been transferred to
HDFS before the execution of MapReduce based DDoS
detection algorithm. There is no particular restriction
on the minimum file count before the detection starts;
it could be set to one.
Figure 3: Log Transfer Phase
3.3 Detection Phase
The Apache Hadoop consists of two core components
i.e. HDFS (storage part) and MapReduce (processing
part). Hadoop’s central management node also known
as NameNode splits the data into same size large blocks
and distributes them amongst the cluster nodes (data
nodes). Hadoop MapReduce transfers packaged code
for nodes to process in parallel, the data each node is
responsible to process.
In HADEC, the detection server mainly serves as the
Hadoop’s NameNode, which is the centerpiece of the
Hadoop DDoS detection cluster. On successful transfer
of log file(s), the detection server split the file into same
size blocks and starts MapReduce DDoS detection jobs
on cluster nodes (see fig. 4). We have discussed MapRe-
duce job analyzer and counter based DDoS detection
algorithm in §3.5. Once the detection task is finished,
the results are saved into HDFS.
Figure 4: DDoS Detection on Hadoop Cluster
3.4 Result Notification
Once the execution of all the MapReduce tasks is fin-
ished, Hadoop will save the results in HDFS. The de-
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tection server will then parse the result file from HDFS
and send the information about the attackers back to
the administrator via the capturing server. Once the
results are notified both the input and output folders
from HDFS will be deleted for better memory manage-
ment by the detection server. Fig. 5 presents a holistic
illustration of HADEC framework.
3.5 MapReduce Job and DDoS Detection
A MapReduce program is composed of a Map task
that performs filtering and sorting and a Reduce task
that performs a summary operation. Here we have
explained how HADEC has implemented detection of
DDoS flooding attacks (UDP, HTTP GET, ICMP and
TCP-SYN) as a MapReduce task on Hadoop cluster
using counter-based algorithm.
3.5.1 HADEC Mapper job
After starting MapReduce task, the first task is a
mapper task which takes input from HDFS as a block.
In our case the block will represent a file in text format
and the input for each iteration of mapper function will
be a single line from the file. Any single line in the
file contains only brief information of a network packet
captured through Tshark (see §3.1). The term network
packet used in the rest of this section represents a single
line content of the file read as a mapper input.
Mapper job takes pair of data as input and returns
a list of pairs (key, value). Mapper output type may
differ from mapper’s input type, in our case the input of
mapper is pair of any number i and the network packet.
The output is a list of pair (key, value) with key as the
src IP address and value as a network packet. Mapper
job also use hashing for combining all the logs of data
on the basis of src IP address, so that it becomes easier
for reducer to analyze the attack traffic.
After all the mapper have finished their jobs, the data
or worker nodes perform a shuffle step. During shuffling
the nodes redistribute the data based on the output
keys, such that all data belonging to one key is located
on the same worker node (see fig. 6).
In HADEC, for analysis and detection of UDP flood-
ing attack the mapper task filters out the packets having
UDP information. In particular, the mapper function
will search packets having QUIC / UDP information.
QUIC stands for Quick UDP Internet connection. For
the packet that contains the desired information, the
mapper function generates an output in the form of
pairs (key, value). The pseudocode for mapper func-
tion is as follows.
%UDP detection mapper function
function Map is
input: integer i, a network packet
begin function
filter packet with QUIC/UDP type
if packet does not contain information
then
ignore that packet
else
produce one output record (src ip, packet)
end if
end function
For ICMP, TCP-SYN and HTTP-GET based flood-
ing attacks; the mapper function will search for SYN,
ICMP and HTTP-GET packet type information respec-
tively.
3.5.2 HADEC Reducer job and Counter-Based Al-
gorithm
Once the mapper tasks are completed, the reducer
will start operating on the list of key/value pairs (i.e.
IP/Packet pairs) produced by the mapper functions.
The reducers are assigned a group with unique key, it
means that all the packets with unique key (unique src
IP in our case) will be assigned to one reducer. We can
configure Hadoop to run reducer jobs on varying num-
ber of data nodes. For efficiency and performance it
is very important to identify the correct number of re-
ducers required for finalizing the analysis job. HADEC
run counter-based algorithm to detect DDoS flooding
attacks on reducer nodes. The reducer function takes
input in key/value pair (srp IP, Packet of Type X) and
produces a single key/value pair (src IP, No. of packets
of type X) output after counting the number instance
(see fig. 6).
Counter based algorithm is the simplest, yet very ef-
fective algorithm to analyze the DDoS flooding attacks
by monitoring the traffic volumes for src IP addresses.
The algorithm counts all the incoming packets, of a
particular type (UDP, ICMP, HTTP ...etc), associated
with a unique IP address in a unit time. If the traf-
fic volume or count for src IP exceeds the pre-defined
threshold, that particular IP will be declared as an
attacker. The pseudocode for reducer function using
counter-based algorithm for UDP attack is as follows.
/* %Reducer function for UDP attack detection */
function Reduce is
input: <source ip, UDP Packets>
begin function
count :=count # of packets for src IP
if(count is greater than THRESHOLD)
begin if
/* This ip declares to be the Attacker ip */
produce one ouput <Src IP, # of Packets>
end if
else
Ignore (do nothing)
end function
4. TESTBED AND EVALUATIONS
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Figure 5: HADEC: Hadoop Based DDoS Detection FrameWork
Figure 6: Mapper and Reducer Operations
In this section we have discussed the testbed deploy-
ment of HADEC and how we have evaluated the per-
formance of the proposed framework with different ex-
periment.
4.1 HADEC TestBed
HADEC perform two main tasks, (a) capturing and
transfer of network traffic and (b) detection of DDoS
flooding attacks. For capturing the traffic we use a sin-
gle node capturing server to capture, process and send
the network traffic to detection server. For DDoS de-
tection, we deploy a single node detection server (also
acts as NameNode of Hadoop cluster) and a Hadoop
detection cluster consisting of ten nodes. Each node in
our testbed (one capturing server, one detection server
and ten Hadoop data nodes) consists of 2.60 GHz Intel
core i5 CPU, 8 GB RAM, 500 GB HDD and 1 Gbps
Ethernet card. All the nodes in HADEC used Ubuntu
14.04 and are connected over a Gigabit LAN. We have
used Hadoop version 2.6.0 for our cluster and YARN [2]
to handle all the JobTracker and TaskTracker function-
ality.
There are several attack generation tools that are
available online, such as LOIC [4], Scapy [9], Mausezahn
[6], Iperf [3], etc. For our testbed evaluations we have
mainly used Mausezahn, because of its ability to gener-
ate huge amount of traffic with random IPs to emulate
different number of attackers. We deployed three ded-
icated attacker nodes along with couple of legitimate
users to flood the victim machine (capturing server)
with a traffic volume of uptil 913Mbps (practically high-
est possible for a Gigabit LAN). HADEC testbed is
shown in fig. 7. For evaluations we have only focused
on UDP flooding attack due to its tendency to reach
high volume from limited number of hosts. We would
also like to add that for all the evaluations we have used
only a single reducer, different variations were tried but
but there was no performance gains.
4.2 Performance Evaluation
The overall performance of HADEC depends on the
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Figure 7: HADEC Testbed
time taken for capturing the log file(s) at the captur-
ing server, transferring the file to the detection server
and execution of counter-based DDoS detection algo-
rithm on the Hadoop cluster. For our evaluations, we
varied different parameters like; log file size, Hadoop
cluster size, Hadoop splits or block size and threshold
for counter-based algorithm, and measured their impact
on the performance of HADEC.
4.2.1 Traffic Capturing and File Transfer
The capturing server work on two major tasks simul-
taneously. First, it captures huge amount of network
traffic (913 Mbps in our testbed) and transform it into
log file(s). Second it transfers the log file(s) to detection
server for further processing. This simultaneous execu-
tion of capture and transfer operations are important
for live analysis of DDoS flooding attack, but on the
hand both the operations compete for resources.
Fig. 8 shows the capturing and transfer time taken
by the capturing server for log files of different sizes.
The capturing time is almost linear to the increase in
file size. It takes approx 2 seconds to log a file of 10 MB
and extends to 142 seconds for 1 GB file. File transfer
takes 14 seconds to transfer 10 MB file and approx. 35
seconds for 1GB file. This shows a clear improvement
in throughput with the increase in file size. Here it is
also interesting to note that the transfer operation has
to compete for bandwidth and during peak time more
than 90% of the bandwidth is being consumed by the
attack traffic.
4.2.2 Number of Attackers and Attack Volume
Table. 1 presents the relationship between the size of
log file with the total number of attackers and aggregate
traffic volume. HADEC use counter-based algorithm
Figure 8: Capture and transfer time of a log file.
Table 1: Relationship of Log File Size with No.
of Attackers and Traffic Volume
File Size (MB) No. Of Attackers Traffic Vol.
10 100 0.22 GB
50 500 0.67 GB
100 1500 1.67 GB
200 2000 3.23 GB
400 4000 5.91 GB
600 6000 9.14 GB
800 8000 12.37 GB
1000 10,000 15.83 GB
to detect attackers. This means that during the DDoS
flooding attack, any particular attacker has to cross cer-
tain volume threshold to be detected. According to the
table. 1, the capturing server has to analyze approx.
0.24 GBs of network traffic to generate a log file of 10
MB and it could represent 100 plus attacker that cross
the flooding frequency threshold of 500-1000 packet. By
increasing the log file size, the capability to capture ac-
curate information related to attackers also increases.
There is a trade-off between the log file size and overall
detection rate, therefore, the admin will have to adjust
the framework parameters that will best fit in different
attack scenarios.
4.2.3 DDoS Detection on Hadoop Cluster
We evaluate the performance of DDoS detection phase
on the basis of different size of the log files, different
data block size for MapReduce tasks, different thresh-
old value for counter-based detection algorithm. For our
evaluations we used one fix 80-20 attack volume (80%
attack traffic and 20% legitimate traffic). We have used
these setting to emulate flooding behavior where attack
traffic surpass the legitimate one.
Fig. 9 shows the detection time on Hadoop cluster.
In this experiment we used a fix threshold of 500 and
data block of 128 MB. Detection is performed based on
different file size and varying number of cluster nodes.
With the increase in file size the number of attack traf-
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fic also increases, which affects the mapper and reducer
operation frequency and time. In short with the in-
crease in file size the detection time increase and it will
also increase the detection rate or the number of attack-
ers IPs, which is a plus point. Increase in cluster size
hardly effects the detection time for files less 400 MB in
size, on the contrary in some cases it might increase a
little due to added management cost. Hadoop enables
parallelism by splitting the files into different blocks of
specified size. Files smaller than the Hadoop block size
are not split over multiple nodes for execution. There-
fore, the overall detection time remains the same over
different cluster node.
Starting from the file size of 400 MB, the detection
time improves with the increase of cluster size. For big-
ger files like 800 MB and 1000 MB, Hadoop work more
efficiently. We can see that the detection time reduces
around 27 to 30 for 800 and 1000 MB files respectively,
when the cluster size is increased from 2 to 10 nodes.
This is because with 1000MB file there are 9 blocks and
with the increase in cluster size, Hadoop will assign the
task to different nodes in parallel.
Figure 9: Detection time at Hadoop cluster with
500 threshold
Fig. 10 shows the detection time on Hadoop cluster
with a threshold value of 1000. In this experiment we
only change the threshold value and all the remaining
settings are similar to the fig. 9. With the increase in
threshold value the total number of inputs for reducers
also increases and this will increase the reducer time.
This is the reason why majority of results in shown in
fig. 10 has couple of seconds higher detection time as
compared to the results in fig. 9.
Figure 10: Detection time at Hadoop cluster
with 1000 threshold
Fig. 11 shows the effect of varying block sizes on
the detection time for 1 GB file. In this experiment we
use fix threshold of 500 and use three different blocks
of size 32, 64 and 128 MB. For 1 GB file the block
size of 128 MB gives the maximum performance gains
in terms of detection time with the increase in cluster
nodes. With smaller block size there are more splits,
resulting in multiple tasks being schedule on a mapper
and adds management overhead.
Figure 11: Detection time with different block
sizes on 1 GB file
The effect of cluster size is prominent on large files.
This is because with large files, Hadoop can effectively
split the files in multiple blocks and distributed on the
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available cluster nodes. Fig. 12 and 13 shows the effect
of different block size and cluster node on the detection
time, with a fix threshold of 500 and 80-20 attack vol-
ume. 128 MB block size gives the most efficient results;
this is because when the number of blocks increases the
resource manager in Hadoop needs to manage each of
the blocks and its result. Thus, it will take more time
to manage each task. For larger block size there is only
one map task to process the whole large block. On a 10
GB file with a block size of 128 MB, Hadoop finished
the detection task in approx. 7.5 mins with a cluster
size of 2 nodes. The detection time goes down to ap-
prox 4.5 mins when the cluster size is increased to 10
nodes. For 20 GB file with a block size of 128 MB, the
time to finish the detection task is 14.6 mins and 8.3
mins on a cluster of 2 and 10 nodes respectively. If we
approximate the numbers in table. 1, HADEC can ef-
fectively resolve 100K attackers for an aggregate traffic
volume of 159 GBs with 10 GB of log file in just 4.5
mins. These numbers will be doubled for 20 GB.
Figure 12: Effect of block size on 10 GB file
Figure 13: Effect of block size on 20 GB file
4.2.4 Overall Framework Performance
Fig. 14 and 15 shows the overall performance of
our proposed framework to detect the DDoS attacks.
These numbers present the total time required for cap-
turing, processing, transferring and detection with dif-
ferent file sizes. For the experiments in fig. 14 we have
used 80-20 attack volume, 128 MB block size and 500
threshold. For the experiments in fig. 15, we have only
changed the threshold to 1000. In fig. 14, we can ob-
serve that with the increase in the file size, the overall
overhead of capturing and transferring phase increase.
A 10 MB file takes approx. 16 seconds (42%) in cap-
turing/tranferring phase and 21 seconds in detection
phase. The best case of 1 GB file (10 node cluster)
takes 178 seconds (77%) in capturing/tranferring phase
and just 50 seconds in detection phase. On the whole,
it takes somewhere between 4.3 mins to 3.82 mins to
analyze 1 GB of log file that can resolve 10K attackers
and generated from an aggregate attack volume of 15.83
GBs.
Figure 14: Total time to detection DDoS Attack
in HADEC with 500 threshold
Figure 15: Total time to detection DDoS Attack
in HADEC with 1000 threshold
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4.3 Discussion
Based on the results presented in this section, we can
conclude that HADEC is capable of analyzing huge vol-
ume of DDoS flooding attacks in scalable manner. Sev-
eral GBs (1 GB file generated from 15.83 GBs of live
traffic) of attack traffic can be analyzed in less than 5
mins. By using small size for log file the overall detec-
tion time can be reduced to couple of seconds (30-40
seconds). But small log files also have an inherent limi-
tation to the number of attacker’s they can track. There
is no single recommended setting; the admin will have
to tweak the framework configuration that best match
their requirement.
We also noticed that with smaller files, Hadoop does
not provide parallelism. This means that if any ad-
min configures HADEC to work on small files of under
800 MB, there will be no point in setting up multiple
node cluster. A single or two node cluster of Hadoop
will do the job within few minutes (2-3) with the hard-
ware settings we used in our testbed. In our evaluations
of HADEC, capturing and transferring phase showed
the performance overhead and majority of the frame-
work time was spent in these phases. This problem
could be easily resolved by using reasonable to high-
end server optimized for traffic operations, instead of
mid-level core i5 desktop that are used in our testbed.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present HADEC, a scalable Hadoop
based Live DDoS Detection framework that is capable
of analyzing DDoS attacks in affordable time. HADEC
captures live network traffic, process it to log relevant
information in brief form and use MapReduce and HDFS
to run detection algorithm for DDoS flooding attacks.
HADEC solve the scalability, memory inefficiency and
process complexity issues of conventional solution by
utilizing parallel data processing promised by Hadoop.
The evaluation results showed that HADEC would less
than 5 mins to process (from capturing to detecting) 1
GB of log file, generated from approx. 15.83 GBs of live
network traffic. With small log file the overall detection
time can be further reduced to couple seconds.
We have observed that capturing of live network traf-
fic incur the real performance overhead for HADEC.
In worse case the capturing phase consumes 77% of
the overall detection time. As a future work, HADEC
framework may allow potential optimizations to im-
prove the capturing efficiency.
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